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Abstract 
The globalization of COVID-19 pandemic and its economic impacts is set to run 
havoc across all economies in the world, throwing many into recession and possibly 
economic depression. As the numbers of infected and death cases rise sharply and 
recovery from the pandemic remains uncertain even in developed countries, evidence 
of shocks across economies including China, the Europe, and the US are already 
emerging. The aim of this paper is to provide an overall understanding of the likely 
macroeconomic shocks of the pandemic, covering economic activities or areas 
including demand, supply, supply chain, trade, investment, price level, exchange 
rates, and financial stability and risk, economic growth, and international 
cooperation. The paper first presents a general and theoretical mapping of the likely 
macroeconomic impacts of the pandemic on an affected economy and then reviews 
the emerging evidence in relation to the impact mapping to understand the nature 
of the impacts. The paper then illustrates the likely impacts using a standard 
macroeconomic AD-AS model and outlines some necessary features that needs to be 
considered while designing policy responses by governments and international 
institutions in mitigating the economic shocks. Assessments of this paper are broadly 
in line with the limited studies available on the economics of COVID-19. 
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1. Introduction 
The outbreak of the novel coronavirus, named as COVID-19 (also known as SARS-
CoV-2) by the World Health Organization (WHO), has been declared a pandemic by the 
WHO. The rapid ‘globalization’ of the COVID-19 pandemic is something that the world 
perhaps has never encountered before. The infection of the COVID-19 virus was first 
reported in December of 2019 in Wuhan – the seventh largest city of China. Among the 
family of coronaviruses, the other coronaviruses the world encountered before are the Middle 
East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). 
Research suggest that the outbreak began from the workers and customers slaughtering 
animals such as pig, dog, rat, civet cat, rat, and snakes etc. at a wholesale market in Wuhan 
(Chen et. al., 2020). Once infected by COVID-19, it can cause fever, cough, breathing 
problem, and in severe cases pneumonia and severe acute respiratory syndrome, heart failure 
and subsequent death. The existing antiviral drugs are of no use to cure it and scientists in 
different countries including China, USA, UK, and Japan are currently racing against time 
to develop a vaccine and a drug (Sandbu, 2020). The pandemic has ignited scientists and 
researchers to explore the genetic nature of the new coronavirus, its infection trends and 
patterns, and new tests for diagnosis. According to Stoye (2020), about 54 research papers 
so far have been published as of 30 January, which mostly examine epidemiological, 
demographic, and clinical issues of the virus and its outbreak. 
Although it might seem too early to talk about the economics of the COVID-19 
outbreak, it remains pertinent due to the ravage it is causing through direct and indirect 
economic impacts across countries. The economic implications of the outbreak is broadly 
termed as ‘Coronanomics’ (Eichengreen, 2020, 12 March), while some call it as the ‘Black 
Swan’ (Petro, 2020, March 20). Apparently, the outbreak has produced a ‘de-globalization’ 
process by forcing countries to lock-down borders, preventing normal flows of goods, capital, 
and humans, and business and production shut downs at least temporarily. That said, 
countries have already begun to feel the macroeconomic hit due to the outbreak and 
economists are increasing looking into them. In addition to dire health consequences, the 
COVID-19 outbreak is producing massive and far-reaching economic cost burdens for all 
nations including China, the US, Japan, Germany, Britain, France, and Italy - the G7 
countries. Baldwin and di Munro (eds.) (2020) rightly say, as the G7 countries share 60% 
of world supply and demand (GDP), 65% of world manufacturing, and 41% of world 
manufacturing exports, when they sneeze, the rest of the world will catch a cold. However, 
since the first COVID-19 case was reported in December 2019, only few scholarly research 
can be found on the economics of the outbreak, while analytical briefs are increasingly being 
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covered by news media outlets and research and policy think tanks. The limited number of 
available organized research efforts portray an early indication and estimates of the likely 
impacts, mostly addressing isolated economic dimensions; for example, Baldwin and di 
Mauro (eds.) (2020) present a brief eBook containing initial assessments of 14 different 
authors about different dimensions of impacts covering general macro economy and policy, 
trade, supply chain, finance, banking, travel, and regional sensitivities. The outputs however 
are partial, due to the fact that the direction and the span of the outbreak’s impacts in the 
coming days are uncertain. The uncertainty also makes it difficult to produce any useful 
quantitative estimates of the outbreak’s future impacts. 
This paper attempts to identify the current and future likely economic implications 
of the COVID-19 outbreak in a comprehensive manner. The purpose of this paper is not to 
produce any quantitative estimate of the future impacts (as perhaps it would take some 
more time make useful predictions), rather it aims to deliver a comprehensive and indicative 
overview on the observed and the possible impacts that could emerge in the coming days. 
In doing so, the paper first offers a general time-dependent (short-run and long-run) 
mapping of the likely macroeconomic impacts – such as on production, supply chain, trade, 
investments, prices, finances, exchange rates, growth, and cross-border cooperation - of the 
COVID-19 outbreak and then systematically reviews the impacts observed so far in the 
context of the mapping, i.e., the observed impacts is studied relating to the mapping 
presented in the paper. To explore the observed impacts, a systematic review is carried out 
on materials published so far by different media outlets, think tanks, research agencies, and 
policy experts. Furthermore, the paper offers an analysis of the likely growth and 
recessionary outcomes using a standard macroeconomic model and briefly outlines some key 
features that needs to be considered while setting policy measures in mitigating the impacts. 
All considered, the analyses of the paper build on available research, analysis, data, and 
standard macroeconomic theories related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The paper offers some 
key contributions in comparison to the research available so far in the current context: first, 
the analyses cover a wide range of economic activities and areas to provide an understanding 
of the broad-based macroeconomic impacts in a comprehensive manner; second, the paper’s 
analysis builds on a unique impact mapping that helps to understand the short and long 
term impacts in an interlinked manner; third, the paper shows how a standard 
macroeconomic model can be used to reflect the pandemic’s likely macro effects in a 
simplified way; and finally, the paper points out some key attributes that policy-makers 
need to consider while responding to mitigate the pandemic’s economic threats. 
4 
 
The paper is structured in eight sections: section 2 and 3 provide a brief overview of 
the COVID-19 outbreak and the relevant literature relating to its economic implications, 
respectively; section 4 presents the general impact mapping, followed by an examining of 
the observed impacts so far in section 5; section 6 presents the analysis of the likely impact 
using a standard macroeconomic model; section 7.0 highlights the necessary features of 
future policy measures, followed by a conclusion in the final section. 
 
2. The Outbreak of COVID-19 
The COVID-19 pandemic has become truly globalized, unfortunately. The numbers 
of infected cases and death globally are increasing so rapidly that the epicenter of the 
pandemic is moving fast. Figures 1.1(a) shows the total number of confirmed cases and 
deaths at the world level. As of 30 March 2020, the number of infected cases globally stand 
at 715660, with 33579 death cases. The number is stunningly high when compared to other 
similar outbreak in the past; for example, the SARS outbreak killed 774 and infected 8,098 
between November 2002 and July 2003 (Woodward, 2020, February 21). However, COVID-
19’s worldwide fatality rate as of 30 March 2020 stands at 4.69%, while 172,435 have so far 
recovered. While the virus has already arrived across 200 countries and territories, the US, 
China, and the Europe appear to be the biggest victims. Figure 1.1(b) reports the top 15 
countries in terms of number of infected cases. Initially China was the epicenter with a very 
high number of infected and death cases, but that moved very fast to the Europe making 
Italy the next epicenter. At the latest, the US tops the list with 164620 confirmed cases and 
3170 deaths as of 30 March 2020, making the country the latest epicenter of the diseases.  
 
Figure 1(a): World’s total number of infection and death caused by COVID-19 coronavirus 
 
Source: author, based on data from European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control as of 30 March, 2020 
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Figure 1(b): Country-wise total number of infection and death caused by COVID-19  
 
Source: author, based on data from European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control as of 30 March, 2020 
 
3. The economics of COVID-19: What we know so far 
Given the life of the pandemic is just about four months, research on the economics 
of COVID-19 is at early stage and still emerging. As the evidence of economic impacts keep 
emerging, research think tanks and media outlets are in a race to publish commentaries, 
editorials, and analytical pieces. Among the first organized efforts, Baldwin and di Mauro 
(eds.) (2020) compile an eBook containing 14 briefs of different authors discussing the 
impacts pertaining to general macro economy and policy, trade, supply chain, finance, 
banking, travel, and regional sensitivities. While few of the works rely on simulation-based 
modelling, most are based on past experience, real-time data, and intuitive and policy 
perspectives. Given the aim of this paper, it is worth reviewing them.  
According to Baldwin and di Munro (eds.) (2020), the pandemic has affected all 
major economies including the G7 countries, who jointly share 60% of world supply and 
demand (GDP), 65% of world manufacturing, and 41% of world manufacturing exports; 
therefore, as these economies are now severely affected, the rest of the world will follow suit.  
di Mauro (2020) term such outcomes as ‘macroeconomic flu’ - a temporary negative supply 
and demand shock - causing output to fall temporarily, followed by a quick recovery and 
possibly a full catch-up on the shortfall. But that happens when it is a normal flu or a 
macroeconomic sneeze - not a pandemic like COVID-19 which is seemingly producing large 
scale, global, and possibly persistent economic disruption (di Mauro, 2020).  
Although it might be a little early to produce quantitative estimates, Boone, Haugh, 
Pain, and Salins (2020) at the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) generated a simulated base-case (contained) scenario and a downside (broader 
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contagion to Asia Pacific, North America, Europe, and other advanced countries) scenario 
using a NiGEM global macroeconomic model; while the base-case shows global economic 
growth to fall sharply in the first half of 2020 and then recovering modestly, the downside 
case suggests a larger decline in confidence, and a much more marked and prolonged growth 
slowdown. McKibbin and Fernando (2020a:2020b) utilizes Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium and Computable General Equilibrium modelling to produce seven pandemic 
scenarios and show that under all scenarios GDP growth reduces across economies globally 
and that if COVID-19 develops into a global pandemic, the cost in terms of lost economic 
output begins to escalate into the trillions of dollars. Arezki and Nguyen (2020) discusses 
about the four three channels of the pandemic’s likely effects on North Africa and the Middle 
East; for example, disruptions in oil price, value chain, and tourism and travels. It is 
inevitable that border closures driven by the pandemic will hit hard many economies. 
Meninno and Wolff (2020) looked at the EU border and suggest that stopping cross-border 
travel would lead to a major disruption of economic activity in the EU.   
Baldwin and Tomiura (2020) suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic is both a demand 
shock and a supply shock – that are likely to slow down aggregate trade flows significantly 
and that a manufacturing distress and supply-side contagion is imminent through 
international supply chain distortions. Beck (2020) focuses on finance and banking risks 
created by the pandemic and argues that the effect would depend on three factors - the 
extent of the pandemic’s economic effects globally, the fiscal and monetary policy reactions 
to the shocks, and regulatory reactions addressing possible bank fragility. Among financial 
institutions, Cecchetti and Schoenholtzon (2020) argue that banks are highly vulnerable to 
the likely economic shocks and they compare the challenge with that of stemming a bank 
run. According to Mann (2020), the interlinkage between global commodity markets, 
financial markets, public sentiment, and the economy is likely to make situation worse and 
challenging for policy responses. To fight back with the right policy, Cochrane (2020) urge 
for a detailed, pandemic-induced financial crisis plan with targeted bailout packages that 
considers the likely bankruptcies and insolvencies and floods the country with money in the 
right spots. Based on the experiences of modelling the economic effects of influenza 
pandemic, Wren-Lewis (2020) suggest that the COVID-19 estimate reduction in economic 
growth, coming as a result of reduced labor supply, higher production cost, higher temporary 
inflation, and reduced social consumption.  
 In addition to the compilation of Baldwin and di Mauro (eds.) (2020), Fornaro and 
Wolf (2020) uses a macroeconomic model and show that the spread of the COVID-19 
outbreak might cause a demand-driven slump, give rise to a supply-demand doom loop, and 
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open the door to stagnation traps induced by pessimistic animal spirits. Assuming that the 
supply disruption will be severe and persistent, Fornaro and Wolf (2020) theoretically 
illustrate the pandemic might induce a demand-driven recession through its negative impact 
on agents’ expectations of future productivity growth. Fernandes (2020) estimates GDP 
growth could decline by 3-5% in a mild scenario depending on the country, with a cost of 
about 2-2.5% of global GDP growth for each additional month of shutdown. While service-
oriented economies will take the larger hits, countries such as like Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain (that are largely reliant on tourism) will be more affected by this crisis. Fernandes 
(2020) argue that the economic effects of outbreak are currently being underestimated, due 
to over-reliance on historical comparisons with SARS, or the 2008/2009 financial crisis. 
 Further to organized research, an increasing amount of discussion is taking place in 
different media outlets in the forms of opinions, reviews, perspectives, and blogs contributed 
by experts and research think tanks. Many of them are discussed throughout the rest of the 
paper. Whatever discussions are available so far suggest that the pandemic is going to 
generate long-run and possibly persistent havoc across economies, which could trigger global 
economic depression. This paper contributes to the existing efforts to explore and identify 
the likely broad-based, short-run and long-run macroeconomic impacts by combining 
theories and available evidence. 
 
4. A possible mapping of the macroeconomic implications of the COVID-19 pandemic 
 The COVID-19 outbreak has already began to affect how economic agents behave 
across economies, i.e., beginning from the lifestyle and socialization to economic activities 
of people and firms. The outbreak’s toll will stretch out across both micro and macro levels. 
For example, productions in China and some other countries have already been temporarily 
suspended by many large multinational companies, and transport routes through air and 
sea to and from China and many other economies have already been closed down, resulting 
in a partial or full border ‘locked down’ (Wilson, 2020, Whalen & Bhattarai, 2020, Cohen 
& Kupferschmidt, 2020). Although the ultimate outcome of continued adverse economic 
impacts could be a long-lasting recession, the effect mechanism, i.e., how a pandemic affects 
economic activities and agents, is likely to be more or less different compared to other known 
events resulting in a similar outcome, e.g., the 2008-09 global financial crisis. One peculiarity 
of the current case is that the end to the pandemic remains uncertain, and thus the direst 
consequences are likely to arise in the long-run if it is not stopped soon. 
Figure 2 shows a general theoretical mapping of the likely economic impacts of the 
COVID-19 pandemic; showing what ‘could be’ the impact’s span and progress line. It is 
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useful to consider the mapping in the macroeconomic context of one single country. The 
figure assumes different waves of impacts over time, where many of the impacts could be 
visible in the short run while others in the long run. Furthermore, many of the impacts 
could be happening concurrently while others sequentially. To begin with the first wave, 
the immediate and direct impact of the COVID-19 outbreak is temporary shutdown of 
factories and businesses in an affected country (as it is the case in China by now) and 
thereby, resulting in a sharp and immediate decline of production in the economy. The 
shock then could be amplified by a simultaneous supply chain disruptions of necessary 
production inputs and immediate drop in demand; demand for goods and services declines 
as consumers follow ‘saving for emergency’, ‘wait and see’, and ‘hoarding’ during the crisis 
(Baldwin & Tomiura, 2020). Also, as pandemic spreads across the world, foreign demand 
for an economy’s goods may slump substantially, which in turn will depress production (this 
might create a situation termed as supply-demand doom loop by Fornaro & Wolf (2020)).  
However, there is an important aspect of the demand response. In a pandemic driven 
panic environment, demand shocks could be different for (i) essential goods and (ii) non-
essential (including luxury) goods. Essential goods are those that are necessary for living, 
for example, food, medicine, and shelter; while non-essential goods such as cars, tourism are 
not a necessity for living. In a pandemic situation, demand for essential goods such as food 
and medicine goes sharply up, while that for non-essential good sharply declines, since 
people tend to save money for their health emergencies, shopping and outdoor entertainment 
are restricted, and panic drives people to not spend unless it is really urgent.  
To worsen the situation, lower production and supply, driven by demand drops, 
manufacturing hits, and supply chain disruptions, sends back some effects to the global 
supply chain, particularly when the rest of the world significantly relies on the affected 
economy (such as China) for production inputs. In addition, when domestic and 
international transports and logistics channels are suspended by the country in an effort to 
stop the pandemic’s spread, it could further disrupt the supply chain. And if the affected 
economy is a world’s major manufacturing-supply hub like China, a continued disruption 
could eventually breakdown or collapse the global supply chain. Furthermore, both 
production and supply chain would be substantially interrupted due to no to fewer human 
movement both domestically and internationally as restrictions and border closures are 
imposed. Globally, restrictions of people movement and lock-down are so far considered the 
most effective ways in preventing the transmission of COVID-19. It is worth noting that all 
these effects in the first wave could be interrelated to some extent and occur concurrently 
in the affected economy.  
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Figure 2: A general mapping of the likely economic impacts of COVID-19 outbreak 
 
 
Source: Author developed 
 
A concurrent shock to the country’s production, demand, supply chain, and human 
flows is likely to result in a significant reduction in international trade flows of goods and 
services (the second wave); for example, a reduced supply, transport routes closures, lower 
demand for imported goods, and lesser movement of people from one country to the other 
- all could significantly reduce exports and imports of both goods (e.g., manufactured 
products such as automobiles) and services (e.g., tourism, travelling) for the economy. 
Furthermore, lesser people movement, economic uncertainty, and interrupted transports 
and logistics - coupled with higher costs of available options due to interruptions - could in 
combination force international investors to hold back on their on-going investment 
activities and plans in the pandemic-affected country. In general, this could hit resource-
scarce developing economies the hardest that rely heavily on trade and foreign direct 
investments inflows for economic growth and development. 
The effect on specific macroeconomic indexes could take some time to feel or to 
reflect in the numbers. A continued distortions in production, supply chain, demand, and 
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flows of human, trade, and investment combined for a slightly longer period will begin 
damaging the macroeconomic indicators of the affected economy. The first of the hits should 
be a sizable reduction in aggregate supply and demand in the economy. The production 
shock discussed earlier explains the reduction in aggregate supply. With respect to aggregate 
demand, while demand for essential goods may increase (e.g., people may hoard food and 
medicine to face the uncertainty, more medicines are needed as more people become sick 
due to the outbreak), that of non-essential goods will reduce sharply (as people tend to save 
for the emergency, suspend non-essential consumption, and spend only for the need of the 
hour). This should lead to a net fall in the aggregate demand of the economy.  
A reduced supply of goods and services will tend to push the price level up for 
essential goods and for those that are normally imported (since other affected economies 
may also experience same production and trade effects, reducing global supply); however, 
that is likely to be offset by the fall in price level of non-essential good, resulting in a 
deflationary pressure in the end. This is because of the differences in the demand elasticity 
of essential and non-essential goods. While increased demand and prices for essential goods 
could encourage some domestic producers to switch from non-essentials, they may not be 
able to take the full advantage if factories and business are sent to forced closure and/or 
their existing technology is not suitable for the switch.  
Firms, under these circumstances, would be forced to lay-off a large number of 
workers in an effort to survive and remain financially feasible, which could significantly 
increase unemployment in the economy. This is likely as firms will face slump in business 
volume and revenues and increases in costs, which may push many firms not being able to 
service their wage payments and debts. Wage payment could be a bigger problem 
particularly for small businesses, who generally have lower financial cushion to fight 
downturns and thus are able to sustain as long as they are able to run profitably. Debt 
servicing could be particularly dreadful for firms whose debt-equity ratio is already higher. 
Many firms in such cases may default in repaying their debts for one or over a series of pay 
intervals, or in a more extreme case, may end up filing for bankruptcy and shutting down 
businesses permanently. The overall outcome of these effects is an increase in unemployment 
rate and decrease in income of people in the affected economy. 
What happens to the overall macroeconomic performance in the end when key macro 
factors receive injuries? This could be understood by looking at economic growth - 
commonly measured by the rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of an economy. 
Once a pandemic-rippled economy faces widespread and adverse macro effects, GDP growth 
of the economy will slow down, as will be reflected over some quarters or a year (the fourth 
wave effect specified in the mapping). Such effect could be a ‘decline in growth’ in case of a 
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normally growing economy or ‘de-growth’ in case of an economy currently facing stagnation. 
If such growth slowdown continues for a number of quarters or a year, the economy enters 
into recession (a condition when real GDP declines for two consecutive quarters (Callen, 
2008) or decline in economic activities such as real GDP, real income, employment, 
industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales lasting for few months (Claessens & Kose, 
2009). In the fifth wave of impacts, the economy facing a continued de-growth or growth 
slowdown may find itself dip into recession, possibly falling to economic depression. 
Recovery from such pandemic-driven recession may be difficult and may continue for an 
even longer period, particularly because there is a lack of experience among policymakers, 
institutions, and researchers on how to fight a pandemic-driven recession. Since the recession 
or depression is not due to some known causes like a financial crisis, governments and 
multilateral organizations must come up with innovative and coordinated policies, with 
acknowledgement that traditional fiscal and monetary policies may prove ineffective (e.g., 
many economies already experience the zero lower bound problem).  
During the recession or after it is over, there may be a significant change in how an 
economy deals with other economies at the international level. In the context of the 
pandemic, the shift may be influenced by the extent and nature of at list three factors: first, 
cooperation received on medication and outbreak management by the affected country from 
foreign countries; second, effects endured by both the affected country and their trading 
partners in the time of border lockdowns and trade restrictions; and third, financial and 
humanitarian aids and assistances received by the affected country from foreign countries. 
The affected country may evaluate the roles of their old friends, partners, and other 
economies in their hard times and may renew their foreign policy accordingly that will 
influence the country’s post-pandemic international economic cooperation and relations. 
All considered, while some of the effects presented in Figure 2 could occur 
concurrently, others could follow a ‘wave-after-wave’ process. While the impact mapping 
will be more relevant to economies having a greater influence in the world economy (such 
as China and G7 countries), it can still be utilized with regard to any affected country to 
systematically understand the macroeconomic effects produced by COVID-19. That said, 
the pandemic will generate significant economic cost burden on the affected countries, 
possibly larger for poor or developing countries since they have poor economic and health 
infrastructure; for example, direct cost incurred for the outbreak management during the 
pandemic (e.g., treatment and medications) and restoring the public health system in the 
post-pandemic period; such cost may be too high to afford for poor or developing countries 
(Vera, 2020, March 30). Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to generate loss of 
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growth momentum for many economies and thereby forcing millions to fall into poverty, if 
no effective and timely action is undertaken. 
 
5.0 The observed effects of the COVID-19 outbreak so far 
From the moment the first case reported in December 2019, the global economy is 
perhaps experiencing the short-term and/or short to medium term effects. New reports are 
emerging almost every day depicting the economic consequences experienced by different 
economies. Being the initial epicenter of the outbreak, China has seen the short term or 
immediate effects before and more than anyone else; while for other economies, the effects 
are becoming visible slowly. Being the world’s hub for global manufacturing and trade, 
immediate adverse effects on Chinese economy are making the economic cost burden rapidly 
globalized. For a systematic understanding, the effects emerged so far in research, reports, 
and media outlets, with regard to China and other economies, can be broadly framed using 
the general mapping shown in Figure 2. Data and information on economic effects across 
the waves with regard to many economies are readily unavailable. Given the origination, 
duration, and the scale of the pandemic as of today, there are relatively more published 
data and information on China than any other economy. Therefore, a brief discussion on 
the observed effects relating to the mapping follows, primarily with regard to China, 
although references are made to other economies where possible and suitable. 
 
5.1 Production, supply chain, demand, and human movement shocks:  
There are evidence emerging that the COVID-19 outbreak is creating an 
unprecedented havoc in the global supply chain, which primarily rely on Chinese 
manufacturing output and raw materials (Sheffi, 2020). There are two key channels of the 
global supply chain effects– one, production shocks and the other, shocks to trade flows due 
to transports and logistics disruptions. Chinese factories are affected by not only lockdowns 
and quarantines but also slowdown in production sites in other countries due to shortage of 
inputs from China, for example, raw materials, manufactured inputs, and machineries and 
equipment (Fernandes, 2020). Thus, a global supply chain shock beginning with production 
shocks primarily in China rapidly spills over other economies.  
The scale of a production shock worldwide is large, as China occupies 60% of world 
supply and demand (GDP), 65% of world manufacturing, and 41% of world manufacturing 
exports (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020). Wuhan, the origin city of COVID-19, is ranked as 13th 
out of 2000 Chinese cities by Bloomberg for its role in international supply chains (Daurat, 
2020) and  the 9th best-performing city of China according to the Milken Institute ranking 
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(Wong & Lin, & Jackson, 2020). With 3 national development zones, 4 scientific and 
technological development parks accommodating over 350 research institutes, 1656 hi-tech 
enterprises, and numerous enterprise incubators, the city received investments from 230 
Fortune Global 500 firms (Bloomberg, 2020). Major export destinations for goods 
manufactured in Wuhan include the US, South Korea, Netherlands, India, Germany, Japan, 
U.K., Singapore, and Brazil (Kemp, 2020). This clearly indicates about the scale of ripple 
effects to be generated due to the lock-down of Wuhan alone for about two months. The 
production shock in China is driving a ‘Bullwhip effect’ in the global supply chain by forcing 
firms to reduce or shut down production and sales. For example, reports suggest that global 
fashion brand H&M announced closure of 45 stores in China; other major brands including 
Gap, Uniqlo, Hugo, Ralph Lauren, Nike, Levi Strauss and Adidas also publicly announced 
about their store closures in central China (Biron & Zhu, 2020). Not only apparels, large 
multinationals in the automobiles and transport industries such as Airbus, Damien Klassen, 
Toyota, General Motors, and Volkswagon also announced closing down their production 
facility in China (The Manufacturer, 2020; Leijen, 2020). 
The other channel of global supply chain shock is disruptions in transports and 
logistics, which causes a halt in the movement of human and goods. Almost all major airlines 
including Lufthansa Group, Thai Lion Air, Spicejet, Lion Airlines across the world have 
completely or largely stopped international flights, as countries shut-down airports and 
restrict entry of international passengers (Pallini, 2020, March 26), and the number of 
international flights have reduced to 64,523 (Leigh, 2020). Airspace closure, travel bans, 
and the slump in the demand have forced 64 global airlines to stop their flying schedules 
(Pallini, 2020, March 26). Similarly, logistics company Freightos decided to layoff nearly 50 
workers amidst the breakdown of their supply chain due to the pandemic concern and lock-
down in China (Johnson, 2020). Air cargos like British Airways parent IAG are also in 
similar trouble (Robinson, 2020). German logistics group DHL, UPS and FedEx reported 
to face severe disruption in inbound and outbound logistics to and from China in air cargo 
shipments, trucking, and rail cargo services (Tirschwell, 2020). The unexpected supply chain 
breakdown have reportedly impacted industrial productions severely in not only China but 
also in many other economies, particularly in countries where producers have a backward 
or a forward linkage with the Chinese market; such impacts have spread across industries 
including automotive, pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and high-tech manufacturing. 
 Another immediate effect of the pandemic is the restrictions imposed on movement 
of people across borders and within countries. The initial locked-down model of Wuhan is 
followed by China at the national level restricting inbound and outbound travelling of 
Chinese and foreign citizens. The lock-down measure is now being followed by almost all of 
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the 200 countries and territories. One estimate suggests that about one third of the world’s 
population so far are in locked-down condition (Hussain, 2020). The movement restrictions 
or bans have contributed to the immediate closure of businesses and factories forcing normal 
business operation to shut-down both within a country (e.g., China) and between countries.  
Further to production, the pandemic is causing demand to squeeze as businesses 
close down and people lock themselves down at homes. However, demand response to the 
pandemic depends on the product type, e.g., essential or non-essential (including luxury). 
As people become worried about their health and lives, save money avoiding unnecessary 
shopping, and hoard essential commodities (e.g., food, medicines) during the lockdown, 
demand for essential goods is increasing; in contrast, demand for luxury or non-essential 
products shows a sharp fall. For example, global car sales shows a monthly decline of 10% 
in sales in January 2020; in China the reduction was by 20% in January (OECD, 2020) and 
by 92% during the first half of February (Jones & Brown & Palumbo, 2020, March 22). On 
the other hand, soaring demand for consumables in China has exceeded supply in retail 
stores (Petro, 2020, March 20; Zoe, 2020, March 21). Also, Chinese import demand of certain 
COVID19-related products from selected countries increased in Jan 2020 as compared to 
Jan 2019, particularly sterilizer imports almost tripled (ITC, 2020). Similar to China, 
shopping centers reported drop in footfall by up to 30% in the US as of 18 March  2020 
(Santos, 2020, March 23). In a similar fashion, an increasing number of reports show that 
demand for transportation, restaurant, travelling, tourism, and cinemas have declined 
sharply in the affected economies including China, as people maintain social distancing and 
lock down at homes; while staying home have caused increased demand for internet, 
television programs, and video games. 
 
5.2 Effects on international trade and capital flows  
Reports available so far suggest that trade and capital flows are significantly slowing 
down due to the pandemic’s effect. China’s trading partners such as the US, the Europe, 
Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, India and Singapore face sharp decline in trade flows from 
and to China. Workman (2020, January 22) finds that China experiences a significant 
decline in shipments of almost all categories of goods including electrical equipment, 
machinery, furniture, lighting, plastic items, vehicles, knit, clothing, accessories, optical, 
technical, medical appliances and organic chemicals. Similarly, the US economy is concerned 
about heightened macroeconomic uncertainty, while facing a lower demand for US exports 
to China (Piven, 2020).  In addition to the reduced trade flows now, the US government is 
concerned about problems that could be associated with importing Chinese goods and 
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services in the next two years, as further complications (e.g., health, biosafety) may occur 
due to the virus. Similar to the US, economies across the world are facing significant 
disruptions in trading with China. For example, Wei & Wang & Verbraken (2020, February 
17) suggests that New Zealand faces a large number of cancellations of their exports to 
China of different products including timber, seafood, and meat due to the pandemic.  
There are a number of ways how global trade with China could be affected by the 
pandemic. A summary of the possible channels of effects and their possible timeline is 
reported in Table 1. China could face significant long-term trade barriers particularly from 
countries that are highly concerned about their domestic health quality and bio-safety (e.g., 
Australia). This means new forms of stringent trade barriers are likely to emerge, which 
may further aggravate trade between China and the rest of the world. For example, many 
economies might impose specific and enhanced health-related and bio-safety requirements 
(i.e., sanitary and phytosanitary barriers) for goods coming from China. All considered, 
China is set to face trade shocks originating from three sources - production declines and 
shut-downs, border lock-downs, and reductions in imports by other economies due to 
concerns over health and bio-safety of goods produced in China. The shocks are likely to 
hit Chinese exports the hardest relative to their imports, particularly in the long-run. 
Further to merchandise trade, services trade, for example, in international tourism, 
travel, education globally, have almost come to a halt due to the pandemic, mainly because 
human-to-human contact is the main route of COVID-19 infection. This happens as 
economies impose restrictions and border lock-downs through air, road, and railway 
transportation routes. Since the outbreak, global tourist arrival has fallen dramatically. In 
China alone, the downfall has been as much as 10.9% (Moore, 2020). WTO (2020) estimates 
that international tourist arrival could go down by 20-30% in comparison to the 2019 figures, 
the effect of which is enormous. Reports estimate that the surge in flight cancellation may 
cause global airlines revenue to fall by US$4-5 billion in the first quarter of 2020 (ICAO, 
2020). Countries that are largely reliant on Chinese tourists are taking the big hit due to 
travel restrictions and border lock-downs in both China and the destination countries. For 
example, Australia’s tourism faces a big shock, as about 15-16% of visitors in Australia are 
from China and they spend much more than tourists from the US, the UK, Japan, and New 
Zealand tourists put together (Farrer, 2020, February 7). Other countries such as Thailand, 
Italy, France, and Viet Nam may also face a similar situation. For example, reports suggest 
that the drop of Chinese travelers could cost Japan to lose around US$1.29 billion of tourism 
revenue in the first quarter of 2020 while Thailand could lose $1.15 billion (ICAO, 2020). A 
similar impact is evident in cargo transportation as well, as container ship operators receive 
cancellation of more than half of the previously ordered shipments to China (Paris, 2020). 
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Table 1: Possible channels and timeline of COVID-19 effects on trade flows between China 
and the rest of the world 
Channels 
Likely timeline of persistence 
Short-term Long-term 
Bans or more stringent sanitary, phytosanitary, 
and technical barriers to Chinese exports to major 
markets such as Australia. 
Immediate, 
mostly temporary 
compliance may 
be imposed  
Some measures may be 
long-term for over two-
three years until safety 
is guaranteed 
Reduced entry/allowance and stringent bio-safety 
and health compliance requirement of Chinese flag 
carrier ships, planes, and vehicles by countries to 
air, sea, and land ports. 
Immediate, 
mostly temporary 
compliance may 
be imposed  
Some measures may be 
long-term for over two-
three years until safety 
is guaranteed 
Reduced entry/allowance of Chinese travelers to 
foreign countries and of foreign travelers to China 
Immediate, 
temporary 
measures due to 
border lock-downs 
and health 
concerns 
Not likely to persist in 
the long-run, once crisis 
is over 
Reduced in-person cross-border business deals 
between Chinese and partner country private 
sector and governments. 
Immediate, 
temporary 
measures due to 
border lock-downs 
and health 
concerns 
Some measures may be 
long-term for over two-
three years until safety 
is guaranteed 
Shift of production to alternative locations by 
MNEs currently operating in China; MNEs may 
consider safer and nearby location in efforts to 
reduce massive supply chain disruptions. 
Not likely to see 
in a great number 
in the short-run 
More permanent shifts 
could occur in the long-
run if crisis persists 
Shift of sourcing locations from China to other 
countries by large global importers of 
manufactured products. 
Some temporary 
shift may happen 
due to travel bans 
and health 
concerns 
Some shifts could be 
long-term or permanent 
Higher cost of transport and logistics services due 
to reduced trading routes for Chinese exports and 
imports. 
Temporary rise in 
cost of trade 
Higher cost not likely to 
remain in longer period, 
once things get normal 
Suspension of production and operation of foreign 
or MNEs in China; this might also reduce market 
opportunity for these companies in China. 
Immediate, 
temporary 
measures to avoid 
disease spread 
Some closures may be 
long-term causing 
permanent 
business/factory shut-
down, if crisis persists 
Source: author developed 
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Many countries having international higher education as a key contributor to their 
economy are set to see big shocks, as they impose harsher restrictions or bans on 
international arrivals. The US, the UK, and Australia may find zero arrivals of international 
students during the pandemic and significantly less in months after the pandemic recovery. 
Among other categories of services trade that are likely to be affected could include decline 
in in-person management consulting and international employment services in China-backed 
projects in different countries and foreign country or institution backed projects in China. 
 Further to international trade flows, capital flows are likely to experience a 
significant decline. As a result of the pandemic, investors are likely to take strategy to hold 
back, watch, and decide later on their investment plans. Also, in many countries, shut-
downs prevent businesses to carry normal business operations including progressing on their 
investment plans. In many economies, corporations are rather focusing on fighting the 
immediate crisis of disease outbreak, putting back all their normal economic activities 
including investment. According to UNCTAD (2020), there are significant uncertainty 
about the future about the end to the pandemic and its economic consequences, which will 
hit private sector investment plans, particularly foreign direct investments. OECD (2020) 
estimates that higher uncertainty modelled through a rise of only 10 basis points in 
investment risk premia in all countries in the first half of 2020 increases the cost of capital 
and reduces investment significantly. Further to increased cost of capital, the other 
investment effect could arise due to delays in capital expenditure by multinational 
companies. Lower profit in foreign affiliates could lead to lower reinvestment earnings, a 
key component of FDI. UNCTAD (2020) reports that the world’s top 5000 multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) have already revised their earnings estimates due to the COVID-19 
effects, with a 9% average decline in earnings globally; the biggest hit on earnings is likely 
in Asia (-18%), followed by transition economies (-16%), while in the decline is about 16% 
in developing economies and 6% in developed economies. According to UNCTAD (2020), 
out of the top 100 MNE's, 69 issued alerts regarding expected profit (41), production (12), 
sales (10), and both production and sales (19).  Due to increased uncertainty and earnings 
slowdown, the downward investment pressure on FDIs particularly could range from -5% 
to -15% from previous marginal growth projections for 2020-2021 (UNCTAD, 2020).  
Apart from the private sector, investment flows into projects under government to 
government cooperation between China and other economies are heavily hit by the COVID-
19 outbreak, at least temporarily. China backed private and public investment projects have 
been practically halted - as money, material, and project staff cannot flow between China 
and the partner nations. There is a possibility that while China tries to salvage from the 
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pandemic, there could be delays or reductions in the size of future financial aid, loans, and 
investment flows to the partners economies compared to what China originally committed. 
 
5.3 Macroeconomic effects  
As depicted in Figure 2, evidence with respect to several indicators can be examined 
to understand how and to what extent macroeconomic effects looks like.  
 
5.3.1 Aggregate supply shock 
The COVID-19 pandemic is set to cause a severe aggregate supply slump globally, 
driven by production shocks across economies including China (Fornaro & Wolf, 2020), and 
evidence are already emerging in support of this. Latest data and reports show a substantial 
decline in industrial and services output across major economies who have experienced a 
quick spread of the pandemic. For example, China’s official Purchasing Managers’ Index 
(PMI) fell to a record low of 35.7 in February from 50.0 in January, according to the 
country’s National Bureau of Statistics, which is well below the 50-point threshold and 
indicates a significant level of contraction in factory and production activities caused by the 
COVID-19 outbreak (CNBC, 2020, February 28). Other different PMIs of China also show 
similar signs; for example, the Caixin manufacturing PMI sank to 40.3 in February is down 
from January's 51.1 and the lowest reading since the survey began in 2004. Similarly, the 
official non-manufacturing (i.e., services) PMI measuring the services sector skidded to 29.6 
in February from 54.1 in January (He, 2020, March 2). Other reports suggest that China’s 
industrial production has fallen by about 13.5% in the first two months of 2020 (Jones & 
Brown & Palumbo, 2020, March 22). Figure 3 reports the PMI’s of major economies 
including China. 
Although official estimates are not public yet, Italy is likely progressing to a similar 
shock. Being the new epicenter of the outbreak, the country has locked down northern Italy 
which is the country's industrial powerhouse. Lombardy - an industrial region in northern 
Italy accounts for about 40% of Italian industrial output - is now locked down (Walker, 
2020, March 1). Likewise, Britain’s economic activities have been shrinking faster than the 
global financial crisis, which is reflected in the decline of the monthly PMI points at a 
quarterly rate of 1.5-2.0% measured in the middle of March 2020 (Milliken, 2020, March 
24). Milliken' (2020, March 24) show that the flash composite PMI sank to 37.1 in March 
from February’s 53.0, the lowest since the measure started in January 1998, while the 
services component alone dropped to 35.7 from 53.2. Morgan Stanley forecasts a massive 
reduction in British economic output by around 10% or more in the three months ending 
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in June, and just over 5% for 2020 as a whole, with the optimism that social restrictions 
can be relaxed in the second half of the year (Milliken, 2020, March 24). 
 
Figure 3: Changes in Purchasing Managers’ Index of major affected economies 
 
Source: Author compiled from He (2020, March 2); CNBC (2020, February 28); Milliken (2020, March 24); 
IHS Markit-CIPS (2020a,b,c,d) 
 
Analysts and economists globally warn of a downturn in output for the rest of the 
current year for all the affected economies worldwide leading to a global slump in 
manufacturing and services output, which is to be severely worse if recovery from the 
pandemic is not made by the end of the year. Figure 3, shows the latest available PMIs of 
major economies compiled from different sources. The figure clearly shows that economic 
activities throughout major economies faces a great slump. Being an epicenter of the 
pandemic, business in the whole of Europe is collapsing like China. In March 2020, the flash 
Eurozone PMI declines to 31.4 from 51.6 in February, which is record low since July 1998 
and the manufacturing PMI stands at 39.5 compared to 48.7 in February (lowest in 131-
month); similarly, the flash Services PMI is 28.4 falling to half of 52.6 in February (a record 
low since July 1998), while Manufacturing PMI stood at 44.8 from 49.2 in February - a 92-
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month low. Similar negative dive of all PMI indexes are observed for the US economy also, 
which could worsen in the next few months as the US becomes the current epicenter of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. 
 
5.3.2 Aggregate demand shock 
An increasing amount of evidence the aggregate demand shocks economies are 
enduring due to the COVID-19 outbreak. The pandemic is set to significantly decrease 
aggregate demand across economies and reduce global demand for goods and services 
(Fornaro & Wolf, 2020). Aggregate demand in China and Hong Kong combined is reduced 
by 4% in the first quarter and 2% in the second quarter of 2020, reflecting sharp declines in 
both investment spending and private consumptions (OECD, 2020). This is primarily driven 
by non-essential demand fall, such as automobiles and non-essential shopping (Jones et al., 
2020, March 22; Santos, 2020, March 23). Retail shopping of essential goods and 
consumables has increased, resulting in empty retail shelves and emergence of ‘daigou’ 
shoppers across the world including China (Greg, 2020, March 20; Zoe, 2020, March 21). 
Aggregate demand in China and across economies is further affected by reduced demand 
for transportation, restaurant, travelling and tourism, and cinemas as people maintain social 
distancing and lock down at homes, while increased demand for internet, television 
programs, and video games as people stay home. 
Demand is also declining in the international market. While Chinese import demand 
for medical supplies increased, overall import demand of China decreased by 2.9% from 
January 2019 to January 2020 (ITC, 2020). The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2020) 
suggests that as China is the world’s largest oil importer in the world, global oil demand is 
likely to fall by 435 kilo barrels per day (kb/d) year-on-year in the first quarter of 2020 (the 
first quarterly contraction in more than 10 years) and demand growth in 2020 could fall by 
30.7% to 825 kb/d (the lowest since 2011) - all due to the Covid-19 and shutdown of China’s 
economy. However, Chinese demand for essential goods in the international market have 
gone up significantly; the International Trade Center data shows that Chinese imports of 
certain COVID19-related products from selected countries increased in Jan 2020 as 
compared to Jan 2019, particularly sterilizer imports almost tripled (ITC, 2020).  
The net aggregate demand response in China or any affected economy depends on 
which response is relatively larger; if the reductions in aggregate demand for non-essential 
commodities and services offset the increases in aggregate demand for essential goods and 
services, overall aggregate demand of an economy is likely to decrease, and vice versa. While 
there is a tendency of increased supply in response to the increased demand for necessary 
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goods, it is likely to fall far short to meet the whole of the excess demand in the short-run 
for two reasons - one, producers may not have excess capacity, and/or two, even if they 
have, they may not increase production significantly as doing this may increase some fixed 
cost that may not remain feasible once the excess demand is over.  
 
5.3.3 Shock to price level 
The reduced supply and demand for products produce direct consequences to the 
price levels in both national and international markets. Price level changes however are 
likely to depend on the type of goods. In the short-run, such as during or just immediately 
after the pandemic, an excess demand for essential goods relative to their supply in an 
economy is likely to push up the prices of those goods, while a reduced demand for non-
essential goods relative to their supply is likely to reduce their prices. But since demand for 
non-essentials fall greatly relative to that for essentials, price changes of the former are 
likely to offset that of the latter. This could eventually lead to fall in the overall price level 
in an affected economy. In the long-run, prices of all goods and services could return to 
normal once the pandemic is over, if enough time is allowed to restore the market. Recent 
reports suggest evidence in support to this hypothesis. Chinese producer prices fell by 0.4% 
into deflation territory in February year-on-year, as a result of sluggish demand and 
prolonged manufacturing shutdowns that have left factories idle for months, according to 
the National Bureau of Statistics of China.  
 
Table 2: Effects of COVID-19 on commodity prices in the international market 
Commodity Market Index/ Price 
  1-Jan-20 27-Mar-20 Percentage Change   
Gold 1512 1625 7.47%  
Silver Price       17.865 14.356 -19.64%  
Crude Oil (Brent) 65.6 21.83 -66.72%  
Copper   2.7925 2.172 -22.22%  
Natural Gas 2.119 1.640 -22.61%  
Source: IG Portal (https://www.ig.com/en/) 
 
On the other hand, the consumer-price index climbed by 5.2% in February from a 
year earlier and 5.4% in January 2020, as slower growth in non-food prices outweighed the 
impact from mounting food inflation (Market Watch, 2020, March, 10). Food prices in 
China surged 21.9% February from a year earlier, outpacing January's 20.6% gain and 
hitting the highest level since April 2008 (Market Watch, 2020, March, 10). Thus, China’s 
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inflation slowed because of larger decline in demand for non-food products relative to that 
for food (Bloomberg, 2020, March 10). Similar reactions are evident in other economies also. 
In the US, in the first week of March 2020, gasoline price fell sharply by 2.01% to 
US$2.38/gallon compared to the week before (Crudele, 2020, March 9). 
Not only at the national level, prices are declining sharply at the international level 
due to the demand-supply shock and trade interruptions. Global equity prices and non-food 
commodity prices fell by 10% already (OECD, 2020). Gold, Crude Oil, Silver, Natural Gas, 
and Copper prices show higher volatility due to the Covid-19 epidemic, with a significant 
slump in the last three months, as shown in Table 2. Crude oil prices have experienced the 
harshest decline among the commodities in Table 2 through January to March period, as 
reflected in both WTF and Brent Crude Oil Index. Brent crude oil price sharply dropped 
by 66.7% in the last week of March from its US$65.6 January price, the lowest level since 
2001 (Jones, Brown & Palumbo, 2020). Over the same period, similar declining patterns 
were observed for other major commodities in the international market; for example, prices 
fell for Silver spot price (XAG) by 19.6%, Copper by 22.2%, and Natural gas by 22.6%. The 
only upside is that NASDAQ PHLX Gold/Silver Sector Index (XAU) index saw a slight 
improvement of Gold prices in the fourth week of March (Table 2), indicating that investors 
might be shifting towards safer investment opportunities. 
 
5.3.4 Effects on employment and income 
The aggregate demand and supply shocks are likely to result in a slump in 
employment opportunities; while new employment may not be created, there could more 
layoffs due to production cuts and business shutdowns across economies. The International 
Labor Organization estimates that global unemployment could rise between 5.3 million 
(low-case scenario) and 24.7 million (high-case scenario) based on global GDP growth 
estimates, while the mid-case estimate suggests an increase of about 13 million in 
unemployment. The estimates seem pertinent when compared to the unemployment rise by 
about 22 million due to the 2008-09 global financial crisis. In the United States alone, jobless 
claims at the end of March 2020 jumped to 3.28 million quadrupling prior record due to 
COVID-19 (Pickert, 2020, March 26). On the other hand, the quarantine and social 
distancing measures used for preventing COVID-19 spread directly shrinks economic 
activity and declines in labor supply. Estimates as of March 10 suggests that infected 
workers have generated a loss of nearly 30,000 work months, and a global loss of labor 
income could range between US$860 and US$3,440 billion. This could push millions of 
workers close to or below poverty line and leave economically and socially devastated in the 
post-pandemic period. According to the ILO (2020) estimates, an additional 8.8 million 
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people (low-case scenario) fall into poverty around the world, while the number could be 
20.1 million and 35 million in the mid and high case scenarios, respectively. Loss of jobs will 
be extremely painful for particularly poor and developing countries who heavily rely on 
export-oriented industries. For example, millions of low-wage workers in Bangladesh - the 
second largest apparel exporter in the world - are on the way to poverty, as factories receive 
cancellations of about $2.8 billion orders from large western buyers and about 70% of the 
workers in the industry have already been sent home without a pay in the face a nation-
wide lockdown to fight the COVID-19 pandemic (Paton, E., 2020, March 31). 
Past experience of epidemic and economic crises suggest that certain sections of the 
populations are affected disproportionately, which could potentially trigger worsening 
income inequality (Lee & Cho, 2016). Since, unprotected workers - such as ‘gig’ or casual 
workers - do not have access to paid leave and social protection, the lockdown impact could 
damage their income stream disproportionately. Also, COVID-19 could threaten jobs of 
millions of migrant workers in the US, the Europe, the Middle East, and other developed 
countries, who normally work under stringent employment restrictions and conditions. 
 
Figure 4: Average earnings revisions of top 5000 MNEs by major economies  
 
Source: UNCTAD (2020) 
 
 
 
24 
 
The increases in unemployment is to be further aggravated by wage effects as 
corporate earnings are likely to shrink. UNCTAD (2020) suggests that the world’s top 5000 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) have recently revised their earnings estimates, showing a 
decline of 9% average decline in earnings globally due to the COVID-19 effects (Figure 4). 
Earnings are likely to take the biggest hit in Asia (-18%) followed by transition economies 
(-16%); MNEs are expecting a decline in earnings by about 16% in developing economies, 
while about 6 in developed economies. According to UNCTAD (2020), out of the top 100 
MNE's, 69 have already warned about the impact of Covid-19 in the form of lower profit 
(41), sales (10), production (12), and both production and sales (19). 
The earning shock would eventually end up with job and pay cuts, producing 
widespread decline in unemployment and wage income. Reports suggest that Chinese 
private companies have significantly cut wages, delayed salaries, and stopped paying 
employees altogether (Chen & Hong, 2020). Many organizations – both businesses and non-
business organizations - are likely to introduce pay-cuts and/or delay in wage payment to 
both local and foreign employees due to not making enough money to cover the payroll. 
The layoffs in affected sectors could cause income loss and demand suppression and worsen 
the economic crisis - a condition known as ‘negative multiplier effect’ (El-Erian, 2020). 
School closures have resulted their employees losing about 30-50% of their wages, and closed 
theme parks have asked workers to use up their paid vacation period and prepare for unpaid 
leave (Bloomberg, 2020). 
In a recent survey of more than 9500 workers by a Chinese recruitment agency, one 
third expressed concerns about the possibility of losing wages, while new hiring has 
completely been stopped (Chen & Hong, 2020). The impacts could be huge for developing 
countries who are major exporters of migrant labor and rely on their foreign remittances 
earned. Loss of jobs and delayed or non-payment of wages in different countries might 
significantly reduce remittance inflows to developing nations such as India and Bangladesh, 
putting extra pressure on their reserve and currency markets. In a continued crisis 
environment, temporary or permanent loss of jobs may force many to go back to their own 
nations and face economic misfortune and poverty. This would further aggravate 
unemployment situation in developing countries that are already experiencing economic and 
health shocks due to the COVID-19. The World Bank predict that such financial impact of 
coronavirus will restrain about 24 million people from escaping poverty in East Asia and 
the Pacific alone (Vaswani, 2020, 31 March). The remittance effect however could be 
confirmed once latest data are available. 
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5.3.5 Effects on exchange rates 
Foreign exchange market shows reactions to the panic-driven environment in the 
international and local markets. Major currencies such as GBP, Yuan, Euro, and Yen all 
weakened on against US Dollar from January to March 2020, with the major hit taken place 
in the second and third week of March (Table 3). Depreciations could be driven by the 
decline in trade flows and fewer international transactions, as the pandemic goes worldwide. 
 
Table 3: Exchange rates of major currencies against one US Dollar 
Currency 1-Jan 26-Mar 
GBP 0.76 0.84 
Yuan 6.97 7.09 
Euro 0.89 0.92 
Yen  108 111 
Source: IG Terminal (https://www.ig.com/en/) 
 
 
5.3.6 Effects on financial stability and risk 
Financial systems are likely to be vulnerable to shocks to both the domestic and the 
international economic system (Beck, 2020; Cecchetti & Schoenholtzon, 2020; and 
Cochrane, 2020). Financial markets globally responded negatively; major bourses for 
example S&P 500, DowJones, Russell 2000, Nasdaq Composite, the FTSE 100, and the 
Nikkei 225 fell about 30-40% by the end of March from their January values (The New 
York Times, 2020). The fall of indexes is unprecedented since the 1929 great depression 
(DeCambre, 2020). Alongside, credit spread has already widened and emerging market 
assets are experiencing reallocation. 
Financial institutions are at great risk due to COVID-19 effects. For example, banks 
globally could face increased credit and default risk, as business generate cash insufficient 
to service debt due to business closures, shut-downs, and lower demand for goods and 
services during both the pandemic and post-pandemic periods. Furthermore, there could be 
lower business prospects for lending institutions, as private sector investment and 
consumption keeps declining or do not improve both during the pandemic and after it is 
over. Many lending or investment decisions being postponed for now may not see light 
again, while cost of financing for financial institutions particularly for banks may increase 
due saving erosion or lower availability of money in the hands of people while facing the 
pandemic. While Federal Reserve has already reduced the policy rate to increase liquidity 
to tackle the impacts, the measure has created increased concern for the health of financial 
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institutions, particularly of banks (Adrian, 2020). Further to banks, insurance companies 
are also likely to face cash drains as a coupled effect of a greater number of claims and lower 
premium collections due to people’s inability to pay. In addition, the pandemic could force 
insurers to think and redesign their life and health insurance products accommodating such 
pandemic possibilities. Furthermore, investment banks may face significant business 
downturn as underwriting business may dip and investment opportunities may not yield 
adequate returns. 
 
5.4 Economic growth effects and the looming recession 
Economists and relevant agencies globally estimate reduced global economic growth 
due to the on-going pandemic, as the end to it remains completely uncertain. The IMF head 
forecasts that the epidemic could damage global economic growth this year, followed by a 
rapid economic rebound (Bangkok Post, 2020). While Oxford economics warns that the 
global spread of the virus could cost about $1.1 trillion in lost income and 1.3% of global 
GDP outside the Asia region (Inman, 2020), some estimates suggest that global economic 
growth could reduce by 0.2-0.3% (Klebnikov, 2020). Fernandes (2020) estimates GDP 
growth could decline by 3-5% in a mild scenario depending on the country, with a cost of 
about 2-2.5% of global GDP growth for each additional month of shutdown. While service-
oriented economies will take the larger hits, countries such as like Greece, Portugal, and 
Spain (that are largely reliant on tourism) will be more affected by this crisis. Meanwhile, 
the outbreak is already having a significant impact on Asian markets, industries, and global 
growth (JP Morgan, February 20, 2020). Forecast suggest that the China’s economic growth 
this year is likely come down to 3.5-4% in the first quarter (Mishra, 2020); the worsened 
scenario in 2020 is painful as the pandemic adds to the injury the Chinese economy endures 
from the US-China trade war. 
Recently revised growth estimates by OECD (2020) suggest a significant growth 
decline for the world economy compared to their earlier estimates in November 2019 (Figure 
5). Assuming that the epidemic peaks in China in the first quarter of 2020 and outbreaks 
in other countries prove mild and contained, global growth could be lowered by around 
0.5% this year compared to estimates reported in the November 2019 economic outlook 
(OECD, 2020). Accordingly, annual global GDP growth is projected to drop to 2.4% in 
2020 as a whole, from an already weak 2.9% in 2019, with growth possibly negative in the 
first quarter of 2020 (OECD, 2020). Prospects for China have been revised markedly by 
OECD (2020), with growth slipping below 5% this year, as adverse impacts on confidence, 
financial markets, the travel sector and disruption to supply chains contributes to the 
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downward revisions in all G20 economies in 2020, particularly the ones strongly connected 
to China (such as Japan, Korea and Australia). A longer lasting and more intensive 
coronavirus outbreak, spreading widely throughout the Asia Pacific region, Europe and 
North America, could cause global growth drop to 1.5% per cent in 2020, half the rate 
projected prior to the outbreak.  
 
Figure 5: OECD Real GDP growth projections, March, 2020 vs November 2019 
 
Source: Interim Economic Outlook, OECD (2020) 
 
Considering available estimates, economists, markets, and relevant agencies (e.g., the 
International Monetary Fund, the OECD) warn of a looming economic recession. While the 
recession has not started yet, economists fear of a depression across economies worse than 
financial or economic rises the world has seen ever before (Islam, 2020, March 20; DW, 
2020, 27 March; OECD, 2020). However, many believe that the process of delivering a 
recession globally has already started, although the course remains unrecognizable 
(Carlsson-Szlezak, Reeves, and Paul Swartz, 2020, March 27; El-Erian, 2020, March 17; 
Schwartz, 2020, March 21). Although uncertain and difficult to predict yet, the shape of 
the COVID-19 driven recession is likely to be different for different economies (such as V, 
U, or L shaped) (Carlsson-Szlezak & Reeves, & Paul Swartz, 2020, March 27; Tooze, 2020, 
March 18; Hutt, 2020, February 17).  
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5.5 Potential for shifts in international relations and economic cooperation 
 The COVID-19 so far is showing symptoms of renewal and revision of international 
relationship and economic cooperation. There could be some positive outcomes in the area 
of relationships between nations, as countries extend help to each other and try to fight the 
pandemic through friendly collaboration. The unprecedented systemic challenges thrown by 
the COVID-19 pandemic, and the global responses seen already, could foster the 
transformation of the traditional patterns of donor-recipient aid relations towards a new 
model of international cooperation between all countries (Prizzon, 2020, March 26). 
However, even during the pandemic, the relationship between China and the US remains 
volatile; while war of words and accusations about the origin of the virus remains open, 
discussions of joint efforts also happen between the two nations to fight the pandemic 
(Fuchs, 2020).  
The pandemic could have international relationship effects in at least two ways: first, 
affecting the existing and the upcoming economic programs under government to 
government (G2G) cooperation particularly between China and other economies, and 
second, renewed partnership and friendship driven by assistance and aid (mainly medical 
related) exchanges between governments. The first one mainly relates to the increasing 
Chinese investments globally. Due to the outbreaks, China backed public projects under 
investment or aid frameworks have come to halt - as materials and project staff cannot 
travel back and forth (Fazl-e-Haider, 2020), which could even cause delays or cancellation 
of G2G aid or investment programs as China and their partner countries concentrate on 
recovery from the pandemic. Currently, China has about 7000 projects underway in 69 
countries under G2G cooperation framework, which could have a big hit due to this 
pandemic. The economic cooperation effects may also extend to another highly ambitious 
plan of China - the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which connects 69 countries around the 
world through road and seaway trade routes (Coppel & Liu, 2018). It is important to note 
that although COVID-19 spread many economies outside China, the country first extended 
their major medical assistance with doctors and medical supplies to Italy before anyone else 
in the Europe. Even other European or EU nations. The extended assistance could be 
attributed to two important marks - first, China came to help Italy in their dire times when 
no other nations in the European Union or the greater Europe remained silent (Wood, 
2020); and second, Italy is the first European nation endorsing and approving the BRI 
initiative (Giuffrida, 2020), indicating that economic interests may have played a role in 
deciding who to share with China’s experience, expertise, and resources in the hours of need. 
However, following Italy, China has extended similar support in small or large scale to many 
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other economies globally. While these friendly gestures definitely have a humanitarian and 
solidarity aspects of helping in the times of need, they could play a significant role in 
developing or renewing international relationships in the post-pandemic world between 
China and the rest of the world. Yet, these implications to international relationships and 
economic cooperation remain possibilities and can only be validated over time. 
 
6.0 A simple illustration of growth effect and recession with standard macroeconomic model 
The COVID-19 effect on GDP is likely to through a complex interaction of several 
factors discussed so far; and therefore, explaining the effects with standard macroeconomic 
models could be difficult and incomplete (Baldwin & di Mauro, 2020). Accepting this 
limitation, a simple macroeconomic model of Aggregate Demand (AD) and Aggregate 
Supply (AS) is used below to represent the likely effect of the COVID-19 outbreak on GDP 
in an economy. The illustration however is subject to some assumptions - first, the economy 
operates in full employment normally and produces the equilibrium level of GDP determined 
by the long-run AS and the AD; second, all macroeconomic effects of the COVID-19 
outbreak (e.g., the macro effects discussed so far) are eventually reflected through the AD 
and AS of the economy; and third, aggregate demand and supply in an economy are 
combinations of demand for and supply of essential goods (e.g., food, medicine) and non-
essential goods (e.g., cars, tourism) - the two broad categories this paper highlights 
throughout. The illustration helps to understand the available evidence on the demand and 
supply shocks discussed in the earlier sections. 
 
Figure 6: COVID-19 effects on essential and non-essential goods markets and GDP 
 
Source: Author developed 
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Figure 6 shows three panels that reflect the likely effect of COVID-19 on essential 
goods market, non-essential goods market, and an economy’s GDP. In panel (a), the 
market’s initial equilibrium for essential goods is at e1 with quantity Q1 and price P1. 
During the pandemic, demand for essential goods such as food and medicine rises 
significantly as explained in the earlier sections of this paper. In panel (a), increases in 
demand for essential goods is reflected by a shift from the initial demand curve D to D1. 
As a result, prices for essential goods increases to P2 and an increased quantity of goods Q2 
is traded. As demand for essential foods like medicine and medical supplies increase, many 
producers may begin switching to produce these goods from what they normally produce; 
for example, in the US, companies including General Motors have joined in producing 
Ventilators (DeBord, 2020), and in China, many companies stopped producing their regular 
goods and started producing masks and other supplies (Reagan, 2020). Furthermore, there 
could be greater imports of such goods in an affected economy. As a result, supply could 
increase slightly in response to the huge demand increases, shifting the supply curve from 
S to S1; the shift however is not likely to be too large for at least two reasons: one, producers 
shifting from other trade (e.g., automobile) may not have enough technology, skill, and 
experience to produce essential (e.g., medical) supplies at a bulk volume like a regular 
producer; and two, as the pandemic spreads worldwide, import demand for goods like 
medicine and medical supplies go up globally - which is what the world is experiencing now 
(e.g., import demand for medical supplies such as mask, ventilators, testing kits, and 
personal protective equipment, etc. increased in all countries across the world including 
Italy, UK, Spain, Japan, Korea, and USA). Furthermore, production of many essential 
goods such growing food in a short period of time may not be too easy. An increase in the 
level of supply now leads to new equilibrium of e3, where now more quantity of essential 
goods Q3 is traded at a price P3; the price is yet lower than P2 - the price attained due to 
huge shoot up in demand in the first instance. However, P3 is still higher than P1, suggesting 
that if no more producer enters into the market, prices of essential goods are likely to remain 
higher than what it was during the normal times (P1 here). The good part of course is that 
demand for these goods are now met at a level greater than the normal times. As discussed 
before in this paper, there are evidence emerging that demand for essential goods like food 
and medicine is increasing, pushing prices for these goods up in China and other countries. 
 Figure 6 panel (b) shows the market reaction to the changes in demand for and 
supply of non-essential commodities. Emerging evidence cited in the paper earlier show that 
there is a substantial decrease in demand for non-essential and luxury goods such as car. 
Pane (b) shows that the market for non-essential goods is at the initial equilibrium e4, 
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where Q4 quantity is traded at a price of P4. As demand falls sharply and substantially, 
demand curve pushes back from D to D1, immediately causing prices to decline from P4 to 
P5 and quantity traded from Q4 to Q5. Due to temporary businesses and factory closures 
and permanent business shut-down and bankruptcy over a long-lasting pandemic period, 
many producers may be out of the market over time. This would push the production and 
supply of essential goods down from their initial level; such production cut could also be 
contributed by two other factors: one, many producers may divert resources to producing 
essential goods instead of their regular non-essential goods (e.g., General Motors in the US), 
and two, a slump in global demand for non-essential and luxury goods would result in a 
lower export demand. The supply cut is represented in panel (b) as the leftward shift of the 
market supply curve S to S1; this leads to a slight increase in price to P6 trading a lower 
Q6 quantity. However, the increased price P6 is still lower than the initial price level P4, 
primarily because the slump in demand prevents prices to go back to that level. 
 For an economy, aggregate demand effect depends on the total effect of demand for 
essential and non-essential goods and similar would happen for aggregate supply also, since 
the model assumes a broader classification of all goods produced in an economy into essential 
and non-essential categories. In the event of the COVID-19 pandemic, evidence cited in this 
paper suggest that the magnitude of demand reduction of non-essential goods offsets 
increases in demand for essential goods. Under the circumstances, combining the demand 
effects of both essential and non-essential goods, aggregate demand in the economy should 
go down from their normal level. On the other hand, the increases in supply of essential 
goods is likely to be fairly little, while decreases in supply of non-essential goods is likely to 
be relatively larger, causing aggregate supply to fall. This is because supply would tend to 
respond according to the magnitude of demand reductions for both goods. The supply 
response is justified given the fact that the share of non-essential industrial goods in total 
production is significantly larger than the share of essential goods in most economies.  
 Figure 6, panel (c) show an initial long-run AD-AS full-employment equilibrium of 
an economy at e*, where the economy produces Y* level of GDP at P* price level. In the 
short-run, a reduction of aggregate demand and aggregate supply due to the pandemic 
effects is reflected by the shift of the AD curve to AD1 and SRAS1. This causes the economy 
to arrive at point es, where the economy is likely to produce a lower GDP of ‘Ys’ compared 
to its full-employment level Y* at a lower price level Ps from P*. This means, in the short-
run an economy is likely to face a lower national output and income coupled with a 
deflationary pressure, and which if continues would lead to recession. In the long-run, if the 
economy is able to restore its output but unable to increase aggregate demand, the economy 
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achieves GDP of Y* but price level would fall further to P’. This suggests that, restoring 
the macroeconomic equilibrium to the full-employment level or at least closer to that in the 
long-run should come with a significant and upward demand shock. 
 
6.1 The looming recession 
 As depicted in Figure 6 panel (c), a continued deflation gap would force the economy 
to fall into a long-term economic recession, which would require a substantial demand shock 
to recover. One important lesson from Figure 6 for any economy is that it runs the risk of 
embracing recession as a result of the COVID-19 economic adversities, which may sustain 
for a longer duration if appropriate, effective, and timely fiscal or monetary measures are 
not undertaken to impose the required demand shock. The outcome of the standard 
macroeconomic analysis supports Fornaro and Wolf (2020) who, using a variant 
macroeconomic model, show that the spread of the virus might cause a demand-driven 
slump, give rise to a supply-demand doom loop, and then open the door to stagnation traps 
induced by pessimistic animal spirits. Fornaro and Wolf (2020), in line with this paper, 
suggest that the COVID-19 outbreak will cause a negative supply shock to the world 
economy, by forcing factories to shut down and disrupting global supply chains. While a 
recession is seemingly imminent due to COVID-19, its shape or ‘shock geometry’ however 
will depend on the shock’s ability to damage an economy’s supply side and capital formation. 
In a situation, where credit mobilization is disrupted, the capital stock doesn’t grow, 
recovery remains slow, workers exit the workforce, skills are lost, and productivity is down, 
then the shock becomes structural (Carlsson-Szlezak & Reeves, & Swartz, 2020, March 27). 
In the most unfortunate case, countries may be trapped into economic depression. 
 
7.0 What’s next? 
While the macro effect symptoms of COVID-19 are becoming increasingly visible in 
different economies, a growth effect hasn’t reflected yet at least in a visible or measurable 
way. But as researchers and economists agree about a looming recession and possibly a 
depression across economies, the world has no time to spare in the preparation to face it. 
Realizing this, governments in many affected countries, particularly the large ones, have 
already announced monetary and fiscal policy measures. Countries such as the US, the UK, 
China, Australia, Canada, and Malaysia have already reduced their benchmark interest 
rates in a desperate bid to boost up the economy, however, economists think it won’t be 
enough (Letzing, 2020, March 18). For many countries, it is not feasible to reduce 
benchmark rates as their rates already reached close to zero in the normal times. Apart 
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from these, countries have already taken or are considering several other way outs, for 
example, quantitative easing, direct market interventions, and fiscal stimulus and bailout 
packages. For example, the US has passed huge nearly US$2 trillion stimulus package to 
revive the economy (Cornwell & Morgan & Shepardson, 2020, March 25).  
Since the pandemic induces both aggregate supply and demand shocks, it is very 
difficult to address the impacts with standard macroeconomic tools (Baldwin and di Mauro, 
2020). Economists and policy makers agree that governments need to take up a combination 
of well-targeted, extreme, and new kind of fiscal and monetary policy actions that the world 
perhaps has never seen before (Letzing, 2020, March 18; OECD, 2020; Baldwin & di Mauro, 
2020). In this context, Baldwin & di Mauro (2020) highlight a range of targeted fiscal and 
monetary measures for firms, households, healthcare, public confidence, and finance and 
banking that can be implemented at the national level and through international 
collaboration (e.g., G7 level).  
The biggest challenge in responding to address the pandemic is that the crisis is 
totally different, unprecedented, and king of new, and not like an economic crises driven by 
known causes such as banking crisis or financial crisis. As this time it is different, traditional 
approach may not work properly. Therefore, any policy measure to be undertaken as a 
response to this crisis needs to be designed considering the following key attributes:  
- first, measures should be ‘all-inclusive’ or as comprehensive as it can be instead of 
targeting one particular agent, activity, or area of the economy; 
- second, measures need to be innovation driven, since for many economies, traditional 
policies may not be as effective as it needs to be (e.g., covering pandemics under national 
health systems services coverage); 
- third, to deal with a globalized pandemic like the COVID-19 that no country can fight 
alone, measures must be coordinated at the cross-border level, such as at the regional 
(e.g., Asia, Latin America), economic union (e.g., EU, African Economic Union), and 
trade block (e.g., BRICS, NAFTA), or other cooperation (e.g., G20, SAARC) levels; 
- fourth, poor and most developing economies by default have a fragile economic 
environment with poor health infrastructure; to help them recover during the pandemic 
and the post-pandemic period, the supranational agencies such the World Bank need to 
introduce special economic and health programs and packages; and 
- fifth, to assist poor and developing economies survive the crisis, developed countries and 
international institutions like the World Bank and the IMF may think of revising their 
terms of existing and future financing to reduce the economies’ external debt burden. 
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8.0 Conclusion 
COVID-19 is jeopardizing economies - no matter large or small, developed or 
developing. As of today, end to this pandemic remains uncertain. The uncertainty is causing 
loss of public confidence worldwide. The macroeconomic impacts in any economy are likely 
to worsen across economies, if consumer and producer confidence is lost and a powerful 
demand shock coupled with massive supply-side supports cannot be implemented in a timely 
manner. In the current context, recovery from the disease is primary and economics is 
secondary. However, as evidence of economic adversities emerge, it would be wise to begin 
from now designing and implementing aggressive and innovative policy actions with a long-
term perspective to prevent the looming. Or, if someone waits for the pandemic to end 
before taking effective measures, it might too late and an economic depression might become 
inevitable and unavoidable. 
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